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A	minor	change	in	market	trading	rules	could	save
taxpayers	billions	of	dollars
Society	could	save	billions	of	dollars	every	day	if	trading	in	commodities,	energy	and	securities	was	made	more
competitive	and	efficient	through	a	minor	rule	change.	That	is	the	topic	of	my	new	research	paper.
Every	day,	auctions	and	exchanges	around	the	world	trade	bonds,	stocks,	currencies,	electricity,	metals,
commodities,	securities	and	financial	instruments	worth	trillions	of	dollars.	Thus	even	small	changes	in
transaction	prices	could	save	a	lot	of	money	for	society	and	tax	payers.
Most	trading	platforms	apply	“precedence	rules”	that	determine	in	which	order	instructions	from	traders	should	be
executed	–	normally	sell	orders	with	a	low	ask	price	and	buy	orders	with	a	high	bid	price	are	executed
first.	Precedence	rules	also	decide	how	orders	should	be	ranked	in	case	of	ties,	for	example	when	two	traders
submit	sell	orders	with	identical	offer	prices.	Such	a	rule	is	often	referred	to	as	a	“tie-breaker”	or	“rationing	rule”.
Some	exchanges	give	priority	to	the	order	that	was	submitted	first.	Other	exchanges	might	prioritise	an	order	with
a	large	volume	over	a	small	order	with	the	same	offer	price,	or	the	other	way	around.	Many	multi-unit	auctions
ration	offers	with	identical	offer	prices	proportionally.
The	clearing	process	can	be	illustrated	with	the	following	example.	Assume	that	Supplier	A	submits	an	offer	that
indicates	that	he	or	she	wants	to	sell	3000	securities	if	the	price	is	£110/unit,	1500	securities	if	the	price	is	£105
and	1000	securities	if	the	price	is	£100.	At	the	same	time	Supplier	B	indicates	that	he	or	she	wants	to	sell	5000
securities	if	the	price	is	£110/unit,	3500	securities	if	the	price	is	£105	and	2000	securities	if	the	price	is	£100.
Assume	that	the	procurer,	who	organises	the	auction,	wants	to	buy	3500	securities.	He	or	she	notes	that	£105	is
the	lowest	price,	at	which	3500	units	can	be	bought,	so	it	sets	the	marginal	price	at	£105/unit.
Initially	the	securities	that	the	suppliers	are	willing	to	sell	at	£100	(below	£105)	are	allocated.	Thus,	initially	1000
securities	are	bought	from	Supplier	A	and	2000	securities	are	bought	from	Supplier	B.	This	leaves	500	securities
to	procure,	which	is	25	per	cent	of	the	remaining	supply	at	the	marginal	price	(another	500	units	from	Supplier	A
and	another	1500	units	from	Supplier	B).	Thus,	with	proportional	rationing	(pro-rata)	the	procurer	would	buy
another	125	units	(in	total	1125	units)	from	Supplier	A	and	another	375	units	(in	total	2375	units)	from	Supplier	B.
If	the	auction	uses	uniform-pricing,	as	in	many	electricity	markets	and	in	the	security	auctions	by	the	US	treasury,
then	the	price	for	each	transaction	is	£105.	Treasuries	in	Europe	often	use	discriminatory	pricing,	and	in	that	case
Supplier	A	and	B	are	paid	a	lower	price,	£100,	for	the	units	that	they	have	offered	to	sell	at	£100.
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My	paper	presents	a	new	tie-breaker,	which	is	different	in	that	orders	with	the	same	offer	price	are	prioritised
according	to	whether	the	marginal	price	is	high	or	low.	Offers	become	more	competitive	if	the	rationing	rule	gives
higher	priority	to	sell	orders	with	a	large	volume	when	ties	occur	at	low	offer	prices.	The	pro-competitive	effect
would	be	similar	in	a	sales	auction	when	applying	pro-competitive	rationing	to	buy	orders.	Though	in	those	cases
the	rationing	rule	should	give	higher	priority	to	buy	orders	with	a	large	volume	when	ties	occur	at	high	prices.
In	a	market	with	imperfect	competition,	it	is	profitable	for	suppliers	to	overstate	their	costs	in	their	offers	in	order	to
boost	the	transaction	price.	In	such	cases	the	new	rationing	rule	will	make	bidding	more	competitive.	In	the
example	above,	it	would	increase	the	supply	at	£100.	How	much	supply	increases	depends	on	the	number	of
suppliers,	their	costs,	uncertainties	in	the	market	and	how	much	rationing	is	needed.	Nevertheless,	as
qualitatively	illustrated	in	the	figure	below	increased	supply	could	reduce	the	marginal	price	and	thereby	the
procurement	cost	of	the	auctioneer.
Figure	1.	Example	that	qualitatively	illustrates	how	total	supply	of	securities	depends	on	the	rationing	rule,	pro-rata	and	pro-
competitive	rationing
In	general,	pro-competitive	rationing	would	result	in	less	strategic	trading	orders	that	better	represent	the	true
preferences	of	traders.	This	improves	the	efficiency	of	the	auction,	i.e.	procured	units	are	to	a	larger	extent
supplied	by	producers	that	have	the	lowest	cost	of	providing	them,	and	units	are	to	a	larger	extent	sold	to	buyers
that	value	them	most.
The	pro-competitive	effect	is	largest	in	markets	such	as	security	exchanges,	where	orders	are	entered	at	just	a
few	price	levels,	so	that	rationing	becomes	important.	The	paper	shows	that	if	orders	are	only	entered	at	two	price
levels,	then	the	new	rationing	rule	could	have	the	same	effect	as	if	the	number	of	traders	was	doubled,	thereby
increasing	the	competition	and	forcing	the	trade	to	be	conducted	more	efficiently.
In	a	procurement	auction	where	sell	orders	are	entered	at	10	different	price	levels	with	a	mark-up	of	around	10
per	cent,	the	procurement	price	can	be	reduced	by	roughly	1	per	cent	–	leading	to	huge	savings	on	large
contracts.	This	means	that	government	bodies	that	carry	out	procurement	auctions	or	sell	emission	permits	or
treasury	bills	would	save	billions	in	tax	payers’	money.
I	have	developed	the	new	trading	rule	at	the	Research	Institute	of	Industrial	Economics	(IFN)	in	Stockholm	with
the	help	of	David	Newbery	and	Daniel	Ralph	at	University	of	Cambridge	and	Lawrence	Ausubel	at	University	of
Maryland.	The	cost	to	implement	the	new	pro-competitive	rule	would	be	negligible	compared	to	the	savings,	when
the	turnover	is	high.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	paper	Pro-competitive	Rationing	in	Multi-unit	Auctions,	The
Economic	Journal,	October	2017.
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The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
Featured	image	credit:	NYSE	trading	floor,	26/9/1963,	by	Thomas	J.	O’Halloran,	via	Wikimedia	Commons
When	you	leave	a	comment,	you’re	agreeing	to	our	Comment	Policy.
Pär	Holmberg	is	Associate	Professor	in	Economics	and	has	a	Ph.D.	in	Electric	Power
Engineering.	He	is	a	Senior	Research	Fellow	of	the	Research	Institute	of	Industrial	Economics
(IFN)	in	Stockholm	and	an	associate	of	Energy	Policy	Research	Group	(EPRG),	University	of
Cambridge.	Pär’s	research	focuses	on	electricity	markets	and	market	design.
	
	
	
	
	
	
LSE Business Review: A minor change in market trading rules could save taxpayers billions of dollars Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-11-29
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/11/29/a-minor-change-in-market-trading-rules-could-save-taxpayers-billions-of-dollars/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
